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BREARD AND

THE FEDERAL POWER TO REQUIRE COMPLIANCE WITH
ORDERS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

683

ICJ

Among the puzzling aspects of the Breard episode was the &linton administration's
claim that the decision whether or not to comply with the Order of the International
Court of-ustice requiring the postponement ofBreard's execution lay exclusively in the
hands of the Governor of Virginia. The ICJ's Order provided that"[t]he United States

21 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942). CompareCohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 41314 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.). See also Calhoun: "In our relation to the rest of the world ... the States disappear."
29 ANNALS OF CONG. 531 (1815-16).
22 U.S. CONST. Art. II.
23 /d., Art. VI.
* Of the Board of Editors.
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should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard is not

executed pending the finaldecisionin theseproceedings."The Clintonadministration
argued that the Order was not binding,but it also took the position that,evenif the
orderwerebindingtherewould be no authorityin the federalGovernmentto require a
postponementof the execution.As the administration
explained to the SupremeCourt:
[T]he "measuresat [the government's]disposal" are a matterof domesticUnited
Stateslaw,and our federalsystemimposeslimitson thefederalgovernment'sability
to interferewiththe criminaljustice systemsof the States.The "measures at [the
United States'] disposal" under our Constitutionmayin some cases include only
persuasion .

.

. That is the situation here.'

Accordingly,Secretaryof State Madeleine Albrightwrote a letter to GovernorJim
Gilmoreexplainingthatit was importantto our foreignrelationsand to the safetyof
Americancitizensabroad thatthe ICJ'sOrder not be flouted,and requestingthatthe
Governorprotectthose interestsbypostponingthe execution.The Governorremained
unpersuaded.In a statementissuedthe nightof the execution,he said thathe had given
"serious consideration"to the requestof the Secretaryof State,whoseviewson foreign

policy mattersare of course "due great respect," but " [a] s Governor of Virginia my first
duty is to ensure that those who reside within our borders . . . may conduct their lives
freefromthe fearof crime.'2 Additionally,
he explained thathe preferredto disregard

the ICJ'sOrder now because doing so latermightprove more difficult.3
It is neithersurprisingnor particularlyobjectionable that the Governorof a state

believes he owes his primary duty to its citizens.4 Although the Framers of the Articles

of Confederationmistakenlyexpected state officialsvoluntarilyto subordinatetheir
citizens' intereststo those of the nation as a whole, the Framersof our Constitution
clearlyunderstoodthatstateofficialswould reason as GovernorGilmoredid. This was
obviouslya problem-indeed, it was one of the principalproblemswiththe Articlesof
Confederationand among the mostimportantreasons the Foundersdecided to drafta
stateofficials(reasoningas GovernorGilmoredid) vionew Constitution.Specifically,
lated treatiesthathad been enteredinto by the ContinentalCongress,and the federal
Governmentcould do nothingmoreabout itthansupplicate(as Secretary
Albrightdid) .5
as "imbecili[c]"6 and "humiliat[ing],"7 theFoundersfixed
Describingthisstateofaffairs
the problembygivingthe federalGovernmentthe authority
to compel statesto comply
withtreaties.First,theydeclared treatiesto be the "supreme Law of the Land" and, as
such,enforceablein the federalcourts,8whichin ArticleIII weregivenjurisdictionover
cases "arisingunder" treaties.9Second, the Presidentin ArticleII was giventhe power
and dutyto "faithfully
execute" federallaw,'0includingtreaties.Finally,Congressin
'Brief forthe United Statesas AmicusCuriae at 51, Breardv. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) (Nos. 97-1390,
97-8214) (the materialin bracketsappears in the original).
2 Commonwealthof Virginia,Officeof the Governor,Press Office,Statementby GovernorJim Gilmore
Concerningthe Executionof Angel Breardat 2 (Apr. 14, 1998).
3 "Should the [ICJ]resolvethismatterin Paraguay'sfavor,itwould be difficult,
havingdelayedtheexecution
so thatthe [ICJ] could considerthe case, to then carry[]out thejury's sentencedespite the rulings[of] the
[ICJ]." Id.
4 But cf Louis Henkin,Provisional
Measures,U.S. Treaty
Obligations,
and theStates,suprap. 679, 683 (criticizing
Gilmore'sdecision); FredericL. Kirgis,Zschernigv. Millerand theBreardMatter,
infrapp. 704, 707-08 (same).
5 Seegenerally
Carlos Manuel Vaizquez,Treaty-Based
Rightsand Remedies
ofIndividuals,92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082,
1101-05 (1992).
6 THE FEDERALISTNo. 15, at 107 (AlexanderHamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
7Id. at 106.
8U.S. CONST.Art.VI, cl. 2. Seegenerally
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, TheFourDoctrines
ofSelf-Executing
Treaties,
89 AJIL695 (1995).
9 U.S. CONST.Art.III, ?2, cl. 1.
10
Id., Art.II, ?3.
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ArticleI was giventhe authorityto "provide forcallingforththe Militiato enforcethe
Laws of the Union,"' includingtreaties,as well as to "make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this

Constitutionin the Governmentof the United States,"12includingthe power to make
treaties.
If ICJordersof provisionalmeasuresare binding,theyare treaty-based
obligationsof
theUnitedStatesbyvirtueofArticleI oftheOptional Protocolto theVienna Convention
on ConsularRelations,pursuantto whichtheUnited Statessubmittedto the compulsory
jurisdictionof the ICJ,and Article94(1) of the United Nations Charter,pursuantto
whichthe United States "under[took] to complywiththe decision of the [ICJ] in any
case in which it is a party."It is difficultto understandhow the administration
could
have concluded thatthe onlymeasureat the federalGovernment'sdisposalunder such
circumstances
was to beseech a stateGovernorto complywiththe Order. Byhypothesis,
thelawoftheland requiredcompliancewiththeOrder and thuspreemptedtheconflicting stateordersettingthe executiondate. The GovernorofVirginiaand the lower-level
state officialsresponsiblefor carryingout the execution were accordinglyrequiredby
federallawnotto executeBreardon thescheduleddate. Ifthosestateofficialsthreatened
to violatethatduty,thenstateand federalcourtswithjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatter
had the authorityand indeed the dutyto give effectto thattreaty-based
obligationin
preferenceto any conflictingstatelaw.
To be sure, the administrationargued that Paraguay'sVienna Convention-based
claims should be dismissed(interalia) on politicalquestion grounds.'3But, whatever
the meritsof this claim,'4 even if accepted it would not establishthat the "federal
Government"lacked the authorityto require the relevantstateofficialsto complywith
the supreme law of the land. For even if the treaty-based
duty to complywith ICJ
orderswerejudiciallyunenforceableforpoliticalquestionor similarreasons,therewould
executed" (to
remainthe President'sauthorityto "take Care thatthe Laws be faithfully
saynothingof Congress'spowers).Puttingaside the questionwhetherthePresidenthad
a dutyto do something(more) to avertVirginia'sviolationof the ICJOrder, surelyhe
had the powerto do so. If the courtslacked the authorityto enforcethe ICJ Order,
then the Presidenthimselfcould have issued an executiveorder postponingBreard's
execute"
execution.'5The Presidenthas the responsibility
and authorityto "faithfully
even a law that raises "political questions." Indeed, to say that a law raises political
" Id., Art.I, ?8, cl. 15.
12Id., cl. 18.
'" Briefof the United Statesas AmicusCuriae at 15-23, Republic of Paraguayv. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th
Cir. 1998) (No. 96-2770).
14 A group of law professors
submitteda briefdisputingthe administration's
politicalquestion arguments.
SeeBriefAmicusCuriae of a Group of Law Professors,
Republic of Paraguayv. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir.
1998) (No. 96-2770).
15
If an executiveorderseemed too dramatica step,he could perhapshave accomplishedhis goals through
less visible measures,such as a letterto GovernorGilmore demanding that he postpone the execution,
buttressedby the threatof a legal action (of the sortProfessorHenkin alludes to, suprap. 681) in the event
of a refusal.Such an approach would perhaps have been more palatable politically,but a letterwould have
differedfroman executiveorder in formonly,and I do not thinkanythingin the constitutionalanalysis
would turnon thisdifference.If the Breardmatterdid indeed presenta politicalquestion,thenthe ICJOrder
byitselfwould not have been directlyenforceablein court.A lawsuitbythe executivebranchwould therefore
have to have been preceded by a presidentialdemand that the execution be postponed; the lawsuitwould
have soughta courtorder requiringthe Governorto complywiththe demand of the President,to whom the
matterhad (by hypothesis)been constitutionally
entrusted.
I shall henceforthconsider the constitutionality
onlyof an executiveorder on the theorythat,if such an
orderwould be valid,so would less dramaticstepsby the Presidentto achieve the same result.
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questions is to say that its enforcement has been allocated to a branch other than the
judiciary,16and in thiscase thatbranchwould clearlybe the Executive.17

to defend the claim thatthe Constitutionleaves the decision
Althoughit is difficult
whetherto complywithbindingtreatyobligationsto stateGovernors,the administration
did not regardthe ICJ's Order as binding.18 I will not considerhere the meritsof the
administration's
positionon thispoint except to note thatit seems strangeto regardan
orderofprovisionalmeasuresnot to be compulsorywhere,as in Breard,(1) themeasures
were found by the ICJ to be necessaryto preservethe rightsof the partiespending its
overthedisputewascompulsory.19
resolutionofthedispute,and (2) theICJ'sjurisdiction
Instead,I shall considerwhether,assumingthe ICJOrder was not binding,therewere
neverthelessmeasures at the federal Government'sdisposal to protectthe important
foreignpolicyinterestsdescribedbythe Secretaryof Statebeyondimploringthe Governor of Virginiato postpone the execution.
Though the nonbindingqualityof the ICJ's "order" gives some plausibilityto the
administration's
professionof powerlessness,in the end itspositionis unconvincing.It
of the federalpoliticalbranchesrestedon as gossamer
would be strangeifthe authority
a distinctionas that between "binding" and "nonbinding" ICJ orders.As a general
matter,in internationallaw the consequences of noncompliancewithbinding norms
do not differnearlyas much as theydo in domestic law fromthe consequences of
noncompliance with nonbindingnorms.20For a state that claims veto rightsin the
SecurityCouncil,one mayquestionwhethertheformalconsequencesof noncompliance
at all fromtheconsequences
witha concededly"binding" finaljudgmentoftheICJdiffer

16 See,e.g.,Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (politicalquestion doctrineasks "whethera matterhas
in anymeasurebeen committedbythe Constitutionto anotherbranchof government").This understanding
of the doctrinehas become the standardone. See Nixon v. United States,506 U.S. 224 (1993); Powell v.
McCormack,395 U.S. 486, 521 (1969).
17 Thus, ifPresidentClintonhad issuedan executiveorderpostponingthe executionand GovernorGilmore
had challenged it, a judge who believed thatthe ICJ Order raised politicalquestionswould dismissnot for
lack ofjurisdiction,but on the merits.See, e.g., Lutherv. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), in whichthe
plaintiffs'
trespassclaimturnedon whetherthe defendantswerethe agentsof the lawfulgovernmentof Rhode
Island,whichin turndepended on whetherthatgovernmentwas "republican" in formunder the Guaranty
on politicalquestiongrounds,but bythisit meant that"it rests
Clause. The Courtruled againstthe plaintiffs
withcongressto decide what governmentis the establishedone in a State," and Congresshad recognized
the governmentof which the defendantswere agents as the true governmentof Rhode Island. Id. at 42. If
Congresshad recognizedanothergovernmentas the truegovernmentof Rhode Island,the Courtwould have
been bound by thatjudgment and would presumablyhave ruled forthe plaintiffs.
18 The administration
argued that the relevanttreatiesdo not give the ICJ the authorityto issue binding
ordersofprovisionalmeasures.Althoughitacknowledgedthatthecommentators
weredividedon thisquestion,
it concluded thatthe writingsof the commentatorssupportingitspositionwere "betterreasoned." Brieffor
the United Statesas AmicusCuriae, supranote 1, at 49. In itsbriefto the Supreme Court,the administration
also suggested,although it did not press the point, that the ICJ regarded its Order as merely"precatory"
because it had merelysaid that the United States "should" take certainactions. Id. at 51. This argument
seems strained.Webster's
defines"should" as "an auxiliaryused to expressobligation,duty,propriety,
necessity.""Should," def. 2(a), WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1983). Moreover,the
inferencethe administration
seeks to drawfromthe word "should" is in tension,to say the least,withthe
ICJ's denominationof what it wrote as an "order." See also Henkin, supranote 4, p. 680 (ICJ Order was
binding).
'9 The administration
disputedthe ICJ'sjurisdictionover the case on the ground that,because the United
Stateshad conceded thattheVienna Conventionhad been violated,therewas not in facta disputeabout the
meaning of the Vienna Convention.See ICJ,VerbatimRecord of Oral Argumentin Case Concerningthe
Applicationof the Vienna Conventionon Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Doc. 98/7, at 42-43 (www.icjcij.org). Paraguaycounteredthat therewas a disputeabout whetherthe Conventionrequired thatBreard's
death sentencebe vacated.Id., Doc. 98/8, at 6-10. In anyevent,Article36(6) of the Statuteof the ICJprovides
shall be settledby the
that,"in the event of a disputeas to whetherthe Court has jurisdiction,the matterdecisionof the Court." The bindingqualityof the Order accordinglydoes not turnon one party'sviewsabout
whetherthe Court possessedjurisdiction.
20 See
Vazquez, supranote 8, at 713.
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ofnoncompliancewitha (hypothetically)
nonbindingorder.2'Moreover,thenonmandatorynature of a treatyprovisionis oftencited as a reason forfindingthe provisionto
be non-self-executing,22
and a non-self-executing
treatyis typicallydefinedas a treaty
whose enforcementhas been entrustedto the federalpoliticalbranchesratherthanthe
courts.23That the power of the federalpoliticalbranchesto enforcea treatydoes not
in factturnon whetherits provisionsare mandatoryis shownby the Supreme Court's
decisionin Missouriv. Holland.24
The Courtthereupheld a statuteregulatingthehunting
of migratory
birds as an implementationof a treaty,even thoughsimilarstatuteshad
previouslybeen struckdown as exceeding the legislativepowersof Congress and the
Court assumed in itsanalysisthatthe statutewould have been invalidforthisreason in
the absence of the treaty.25
Whatis importantforpresentpurposesis that,accordingto
the Court, the treatydid not, strictly
speaking,requirethe United States to enact the
legislationCongress enacted; it only required the United States to "propose" such
legislationto Congress.26Yet the Court found that Congresshad the authorityunder
the Constitutionto enact the contemplatedlegislation.
It is true that the Supreme Court has in recentyearsbeen takingfederalism-based
limitationson congressionalauthoritymore seriouslythan it has at any timesince the
NewDeal.27ButtheClintonadministration
has been resistingthistrend,not encouraging
it.It would be ironicifthe one area in whichthe administration
were to championsuch
a trendwere that of foreignaffairsand treatyimplementation.Afterall, Missouriv.
Hollandwas decided at a timewhen the Courtwas stillstriking
downcommercialstatutes
as violationsof the CommerceClause. Since congressionalauthorityregardingforeign
affairsand treatyenforcementhas long been thoughtto be farlessvulnerableto federalism-basedchallengesthandomesticlegislation,itwould be odd ifthiswere the one area
in whichthe administration
believed thatthe states'constitutionalprerogativeslimited
the Congress.28
21
UN CHARTER Arts.27, 94; ICJ STATUTE, June 26, 1945, Art.58, 59 Stat. 1055, TS No. 993. The Clinton
administration
conceded in itsbriefto the Supreme Court thatfinaldecisionsof the ICJare bindingunder
Article94(1) of the UN Charter.Briefforthe United Statesas AmicusCuriae, supranote 1, at 50. Yet,even
though the ICJ decided in the Nicaraguacase that "the United Stateshad violatedcustomaryinternational
law and [a treaty]by a number of acts," BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 329
(2d ed. 1995), and indicatedthat the United Stateswas "under a dutyimmediatelyto cease and to refrain
fromall such acts," Militaryand Paramilitary
Activities
in and againstNicaragua (Nicar.v. U.S.), Merits,1986
ICJREP. 14, 146-49, para. 292 (June 27), the United States"veto[ed] a SecurityCouncil resolutioncalling
upon it to comply," Richard B. Bilder, The UnitedStatesand theWorldCourtin thePost-"Cold War"Era, 40
CATH. U. L. REv. 251, 255 (1991) (citingUnited Nations SecurityCouncil: ExcerptsfromVerbatimRecords
DiscussingI.CJ.Judgmentin Nicaragua v. United States,25 ILM 1337, 1352, 1363 (1986)), "ignor[ed] . . .
[the ICJ's] finalOrder," Detlev F. Vagts,TakingTreaties
LessSeriously,
92 AJIL458, 461 (1998), and "took no
stepsto change its activitiesin CentralAmerica,"CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra,at 329.
I am notsuggestingthat"bindingness"alwaysor necessarilyturnson theavailability
ofeffective
enforcement
mechanisms.In internationallaw, it assuredlydoes not. My point is that the internationallaw distinction
judgment
betweenwhatis bindingand whatfallsshortof bindingnessis too elusivea basisfora constitutional
about the allocation of powerbetweenthe federaland stategovernments.
22 Seegenerally
Vazquez, supranote 8, at 712- 13 (citingcases). I am usingthe terms"binding" and "mandaas apparentlythe SolicitorGeneralwas. SeeBrieffortheUnitedStatesas AmicusCuriae,
tory"interchangeably,
supranote 1, at 51 (order is not bindingif the partiesnot "required to heed" it).
23 SeeVazquez, supranote 8, at 695-96 (citingauthorities).Seealso Lori FislerDamrosch, TheJusticiability
of
Paraguay'sClaimofTreatyViolation,
infrap. 697, 698.
24
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
25
Id. at 434.
26
Id. at 431.
27
SeePrintzv. United States,117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996); United
Statesv. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28 Professors
in which
Bradleyand Goldsmithwritein thisAgorathat" [t]here maybe some instances.
the federalpoliticalbrancheswilllack the authorityto overridestatelaw, even pursuantto a treaty."Curtis
A. Bradley& Jack L. Goldsmith,TheAbidingRelevanceofFederalism
to U.S. ForeignRelations,suprap. 675, 677
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In any event, arguments made by the administration in this and other recent cases

strongly
suggestthatitdoes not thinkthatthereare significant
federalism-based
constitutionallimitson congressionalauthorityin thisarea. For example, at an earlierstage of
the Breardlitigation,the administrationadvanced the ratherbold argumentthat the
EleventhAmendmentis inapplicablein theforeignaffairsarea,29an argumentthelower
courtrejected.30It is thuslikelythattheadministration
misspokewhenit said thefederal
Governmentas a whole lacked the authority
to requirecompliancewiththe ICJOrder.
It probablymeantto maintainonlythatthe executiveand judicial brancheslacked such
authority.
Iftheadministration
was makinga statementabout thehorizontalallocationofpowers
among the branches of the federal Government,its argumentis in some respectsrefreshing.Practically
fromthebeginningof our history,
the executivebranchhas claimed
ever-broaderinherentpowersin the area of foreignaffairsat the expense of both the
legislativeand thejudicial branches.Even wherethe constitutionaltextappears to alloto Congress,the Presidenthas made broad claims of independent
cate responsibility
based on his unenumerated"foreignaffairs"power.Mostrelevantly,
the Presiauthority
denthas long claimed (and the courtshave conceded him) the authority
to act independentlyto protectU.S. citizensabroad, even when the actions taken brush up against
Congress'spowerto declarewar.3' Though it is laudable thatthe Presidentis now taking
seriouslythe constraintsthe Constitutionplaces on his authorityeven in the realm of
foreignaffairs(if thatis what he is doing), it is surprisingthat he would disclaimthe
authorityto protectU.S. citizensabroad throughactions thatdo not implicatepowers
n.18. But seeHenkin, supranote 4, pp. 682-83. Be thatas it may,no one maintainsthat regulationof the
treatmentof aliens is beyond the treaty-making
power,even if thatregulation"interfereswith" the freedom
of statesto enforcetheircriminallaws.It is commonfortreatiesto "interferewith" the freedomof the states
partiesto enforcetheircriminallaws againstnationalsof the other statesparties.Cf ItalyDismissesSki Case,
N.Y.TIMES, July14, 1998,at A4 (reportingthatan Italiancourthad dismissedcriminalcases againstAmericans,
rulingthat "Italian courtslackedjurisdictionunder a NATO treaty").
29 SeeBriefof the United Statesas AmicusCuriae, supranote 13, at 30-32. In othercases, the administration
has advanced the somewhatmore limitedargumentthatthe 11thAmendmentdoes not restrictCongress's
exerciseof the War Power. SeeBriefof the United Statesas Intervenorat *5-15, Velasquez v. Frapwell,No.
IP 96-0557-C H/G, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1344 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 1998); Brief of the United States as
at 6-17, Velasquez v. Frapwell,Nos. 98-1547,98-2034 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 1998); Briefof
Intervenor-Appellant
the United Statesas Intervenorat 6-17, Palmatierv. MichiganDept. of State Police, No. 97-1982 (6th Cir.
Dec. 15, 1997); ReplyBriefforthe United Statesas Intervenorat 2-5, Palmatierv. MichiganDept. of State
Police, No. 97-1982 (6th Cir. Feb. 18, 1998). One courtadopted thatpositionshortlyafterthe Court decided
in Seminole
TribethatCongressdoes not have the authority
to abrogate 11thAmendmentimmunity
under the
Commerce Power, seeDiaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson,90 F.3d 609, 616 (lst Cir. 1996), but the district
courtsin Velasquez
and Palmatier
rejectedthe argument.
3"The court in RepublicofParaguayv. Allenaffirmedthe districtcourt's dismissalon 11th Amendment
grounds,134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir.), cert.denied,118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998), and the Supreme Court expressed
agreementwiththisdispositionofthecase. The SupremeCourt's11thAmendmentdecisionsdrawa distinction
betweensuitsagainststateofficialsseekingretrospective
reliefsuch as damages,whichare barredbythe 11th
Amendment,and suitsagainststateofficialsseekingprospectiverelieffroma continuingor threatenedviolation
of federallaw, which are permittedunder the Ex parteYoungexception. Paraguayclaimed that its suit fell
withinthe Ex parteYoungexception because it was seekingto preventa futureviolationof federallaw (i.e.,
the enforcementof an illegaldeath sentence),but the lowercourtsfoundthatParaguaywas seekingretrospectivereliefbecause it was complainingof a pastviolationof the Vienna Convention(i.e., the failureto inform
Breardof his rightto consultwithhis consul). The NinthCircuitreached the same decision in a similarcase.
United Mexican Statesv. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.denied,118 S.Ct. 1517 (1998). In another
article,I takeissuewiththese 11thAmendmentholdings,whichiffollowedwould call into questionall habeas
corpusjurisprudence.SeeCarlos Manuel Vazquez, Nightand Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and theUnraveling
in Eleventh
Distinction
Amendment
oftheProspective-Retrospective
Doctrine,
87 GEO. LJ. 1 (1998). In his briefto the
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General pointedlydeclined to endorse the lower courts' 11th Amendment
holdings.SeeBriefforthe United Statesas AmicusCuriae, supranote 1, at 15-16.
31 See, e.g., the oft-cited
(by Presidents)opinion ofJusticeNelson on circuitin Durand v. Hollins,8 F. Cas.
111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
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thatthe Constitutionexplicitlyreposes in anotherbranch of the federalGovernment.32
It was not that long ago that PresidentClinton relied at least in part on the need to
protectU.S. citizensabroad in defendinghis decision to launch a militaryintervention
in Haiti in the face of congressionaloppositionand withouteven a plausible claim that
the threatto U.S. citizensthereamounted to any sortof emergency.33
Far be it fromme to criticizethe administration
foractingon constitutional
principle
even though,had the Presidentissued an executiveorderpostponingthe execution,he
would likelyhave "gotten awaywith" protectingthe importantnational intereststhe
Secretaryof State enumerated.34I do think,however,thatthe administration
construed
its authorityundulynarrowly.An executiveorder postponingthe execution of Angel
Breardwould have fallen,in myview,well withina fair,even modest,understandingof
the President'sauthorityto execute treaties,combined withhis foreignaffairspower.
As alreadynoted, the distinctionbetweenbindingand nonbindinginternationalorders
seemstoo flimsyto supportajudgment about the constitutional
allocationof theauthorityto execute treaties.Justas a nonmandatorytreatycan ground congressionalaction
in an area otherwisereservedto the states,so may treatiesvalidlydelegate authorityto
the Presidentto takeaction he would not otherwisehave been empoweredto take,even
if theydo not requirethe Presidentto take the action.35Even if we assumed thatICJ
orders of provisionalmeasures were nonbinding,it would be reasonable to conclude
thatthe UN Charter,in conjunctionwiththe Statuteof the ICJ,36
to
delegatesauthority
the Presidentto take action to complyif he believesit is in the national interestto do
so. As noted, Congresshas the authorityto require compliance withsuch nonbinding
orders.But provisionalmeasuresbytheirnaturemustoftenbe takenquicklyto preserve
the statusquopendente
lite.It is accordinglyreasonableto hold thata treatythatauthorizes
the ordering of nonmandatoryprovisionalmeasures leaves the decision whetherto
complywithsuch orders to the Executive,the only politicalbranch thatcan act with
expedition.37
32
It mightperhaps be argued thatthe President'sauthorityto protectU.S. citizensabroad throughmilitary
action standson a firmerconstitutionalfootingthan his authorityto protectU.S. citizensabroad by taking
the steps the ICJ ordered, because in the formercontext his authorityrestson an explicitconstitutional
provision-the Commander-in-Chief
Clause. But, at best, this clause merelycounterbalancesthe explicit
constitutionallimitationfound in the War PowersClause. In any event,onlyratherrecentlyhave Presidents
Clause as the source of theirauthorityto protectU.S. citizens
begun to relyon the Commander-in-Chief
in thisregardwas thoughtto derivefromthe "Take
abroad. For mostof our history,
the President'sauthority
Care" Clause. SeeDurand,8 F. Cas. at 112; In reNeagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-66 (1890).
33 See,e.g.,Clinton
toDiscussHaiti on TV,NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,N.C.), Sept. 14, 1994, at Al; WhyInvade
STATEJ.-REG.
(Springfield,Ill.),July15, 1994, at 1.
Haiti? U.S. BuildsCase, ClintonWaryofPublicOpposition,
34 I doubt thatthe stateofficials
chargedwithexecutingBreardwould have disregardedan executiveorder
postponingthe execution. They may have complied withoutchallengingit. Had they (or the Governor)
have resultedin the
challenged the order in court, the delay in resolvingthe dispute would effectively
postponementof the execution.
35 For example, treatiescan give the Presidentthe authority
to enterinto executiveagreementshe would
the
not otherwisehave the authorityto conclude withoutSenate consent,even if the treatydoes not require
Presidentto conclude any particularagreement,or any agreementat all, or even to negotiateone. SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ?303 cmt.f (1987) ("An executive
agreementmay be made by the Presidentpursuantto a treatywhen the executiveagreementcan fairly
be seen as implementingthe treaty,especiallyif the treatycontemplatedimplementationby international
agreement.").
36Article93 of the UN Charterprovidesthat"[a]ll membersof the United Nationsare ipsofactopartiesto
the Statuteof the [ICJ]," and Article41(1) of the ICJStatute,supranote 21, givesthe ICJthe powerto indicate
provisionalmeasures.
37 A treatythatgives the ICJ the power to urge(ratherthan require) the partiesto take action by wayof
provisionalmeasurespresupposesthatsome officialor group of officialsof the statespartieshas the authority
the relevantofficialsin the United States is a matterof
to decide whetherto take the action. Identifying
domesticlaw. We have seen thatCongressand the President(throughlegislation)have the powerto compel
the statesto take action urged by the ICJ.But, because of the nature of provisionalmeasures,the decision
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There is, indeed, precedent thatwould support the President'sauthorityto act to
protectU.S. interestsabroad in an emergencyevenwhenthe Presidentdoes not purport
to be executinga treaty.Dames & Moorev. Regan38employeda context-sensitive,
allthings-considered
approach to adjudicate the validityof exercises of the President's
some of thefactorssupportingthe actions
emergencyforeignaffairspower.Admittedly,
upheld in thatcase are not presenthere.39But factorsnot presentin thatcase would
have supporteda decision by PresidentClintonto issue an executiveorder postponing
the plausibleclaim thatthe UN Charterdelegated
Breard'sexecution,mostimportantly
him the authorityto do so and the factthatthe Order would have been in anticipation
of a concededlybindingfinaldecision of the ICJ.At the veryleast,the Dames& Moore
analysiswould have supportedan executiveorderpostponingthe executionfora period
to give the matteradequate
no longer than necessaryto give Congressthe opportunity
consideration.
If therewere meritto the claim thatour Constitutionand statutes,as theycurrently
exist,leave the finaldecision about whetheror not to complywithICJordersof provisional measuresto stateGovernors,thenwe should all be able to agree thatour Constitution and statutesare deficientin thisregard,forreasonswellstatedbyour Founders.As
alreadyexplained,solvingthe problemwould not requirea constitutional
amendment:a
simple statutewould do. If the administrationbelieved its own argument,we would
expect it to be urgingCongressto enact a statutegivingit the authorityto execute ICJ
ordersof provisionalmeasures.Perhaps it will soon do so. If it does not,we willhave
reason to surmisethatthe argumentsit made to the Supreme Court did not reflectits
and notwell-thoughtconsideredconstitutional
judgmentsbut,instead,wereshort-term
out litigationmaneuvers-that, farfromactingon constitutional
principle,the administrationadvancedill-foundedconstitutional
argumentsto disguisea purelypoliticaldecision. A cynicmightsuggestthatthe decision not to postpone the execution,or even
supportParaguay'srequestthatthe SupremeCourtdo so, was motivatedbyfearofbeing
If so, the attemptto
portrayedas softon crime or as abdicatingnational sovereignty.
foiston GovernorGilmorethe politicalcosts of protectingthe nation's foreignpolicy
interests
was not onlylegallyunfoundedand doomed to failure,butalso highlyinapprofor makingsuch decisions,and
priate,for the Constitutionplaces the responsibility
takingthe necessaryheat,on the federalGovernment.We can onlyspeculateabout the
true reasons for the administration'sdecision to take the positionit did, but I would
not be astounded if the professionof a lack of constitutionalpowerwas disingenuous.
Of course,candor is not alwaysadvisablein the diplomaticrealm,and dissemblancein
thiscase could conceivablyhave been defended as necessaryto reduce the danger to
U.S. citizensabroad thatconcerned the Secretaryof State. But takingill-foundedand
whetherto take the relevantactions will oftenhave to be made quickly.Since legislatingtakes time,it is
reasonable to interpretthe pertinenttreatyto delegate the decision to the President.
38453 U.S. 654 (1981).
39 In particular,
therehad been a long historyof congressionalacquiescence in executiveclaimssettlement.
453 U.S. at 681. Some have suggestedthatpresidentialaction to postpone Breard's executionwould have
Death PenaltyAct. But the antiterrorism
contravenedthe Antiterrorism
and Effective
law limitsthe powerof
federalcourts
to entertainhabeas corpus petitionsby personsin custodyin violationof federallaw who have
failedto raisetheirfederalclaimin statecourtsin accordancewithstateprocedures.This lawdoes not purport
to limitthe federal courts'jurisdictionover Paraguay'sclaim based on the Vienna Convention,and the
Supreme Court did not relyon it in denyingParaguay'spetitions.It is even less plausible to claim thatthe
statutelimitsthe federal courts'jurisdictionin claims by foreignstatesseeking to enforceICJjudgments
involvingdeath sentences.Finally,even if the law did reflecta congressionaldecision to deny the courts
jurisdictionover such claims,it would not reflecta decision to deny the executive
branchthe power to take
action contemplatedby an ICJ order. Indeed, such a (hypothetical)congressionaljudgment could as easily
reflectthe viewthatthispowerproperlyresidesin the Presidentratherthan the courts.
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insincereconstitutional
positionsin litigationis a strategythatcan come back to haunt
a Presidentor his successors.In any event,the readers of thisJournalshould not be
misled:our Constitutiondoes not leave the decisionwhetherto complywithICJorders,
be theytechnically"binding"or not,to stateGovernors.Ifthecourtslackedtheauthority
to require the statesto comply(as the administration
argued), then the Presidenthad
the authority.
Eitherhe mistakenly
(and uncharacteristically)
thoughtthathe lacked it
or he declined to use it forreasons he preferrednot to disclose.40
CARLOS MANUEL VAZQUEZ*

*Professor

of Law, Georgetown

University Law Center.

BREARDAND TREATY-BASEDRIGHTS UNDER THE CONSULAR CONVENTION
I. RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUALACCUSED OR PETITIONER

Article36(1) of theViennaConventionon ConsularRelationsprovidesthat(a) " [n]ationals. .. shallhave thesame freedomwithrespectto communicationwithand access
to consularofficers,"and that (b) "[t] he said authoritiesshall informthe person concerned withoutdelay of his rightsunder thissub-paragraph."'In Breardv. Greene,the
SupremeCourtnearlyrecognizedthat,under the Convention,the individualpetitioner
had actionablerightsthathad been violated.2The Court concluded,however,thatthe
4"Even the mostvocal currentdefendersof stateprerogativesin the foreignaffairsarea (ProfessorsBradley
and Goldsmith)agree that"the politicalbranches" of the federalGovernment(whichat a minimummeans
Congressand the President,throughlegislation)had the power to require compliance byVirginiawiththe
ICJOrder (whetheror not itwas "binding"). Bradley& Goldsmith,supranote 28, p. 679. Their contribution
suggeststhattheyalso agree thatthe Presidenthad the powerto do so alone, eitheron his own constitutional
authority
or throughdelegation.Id. n.30 (notingpossiblepoliticalconcernsthatmighthave led the Executive
not "to compel Virginia'scompliancewiththe ICJOrder"). But cf.id. p. 679 (notingthat"difficult
questions
about the distributionof foreignrelationsauthorityat the federallevel" mightresultif politicalbranches
disagreeabout "relativepriority
of domesticand internationalinterests").At theveryleast,theircontribution
concedes thatthe Presidenthad a reasonableclaim to such authority.
Their suggestionthatthe administration
decided not to exercisethisauthority
because it concluded thattheforeignrelationsinterests
wereoutweighed
byfederalism-based
interests,seeid.,seems inconsistentwiththe Secretaryof State's attemptto "persua[de]"
the Governorto postpone the execution.Their alternativesuggestionthat the administration
declined to
exercise its authorityto compel Virginia'scompliance with the ICJ Order because doing so mighthave
compromiseditsabilityto achieveitsotherforeignrelationsgoals in Congress,seeid. n.30, is more plausible,
but does not support their centralclaim that federalism-basedinterestsremain importantin the foreign
relationsarea.
I do not doubt that,under our constitutionalsystem,it is oftenforthe federalpoliticalbranchesto decide
whenforeignpolicyinterestswarrantaction (or inaction) bythe states,and thatin makingthisdetermination
it is appropriateforthose branchesto take into account "federalismconcerns." The Senate presumablytook
federalisminterestsinto accountwhen it consentedto the Vienna Conventionon ConsularRelations,as did
the Presidentwhen he ratifiedit. But these actionstransformed
whathad been mere foreignpolicyinterests
into legalobligationsof the United States,includingVirginia.Paraguayargued that,because of Virginia's
conceded violationof thistreaty,
the treaty(implicitly)requiredthatBreard'sdeath sentencebe vacated.The
executivebranchargued thatit did not require this,and thatwas the issue beforethe ICJ.Anothertreatyof
the United Statesgivesthe ICJjurisdictionto indicate provisionalmeasuresin cases beforeit, and requires
partiesto complywithICJjudgments.Ifthoseorderswerebinding,thentheytoo werelegalobligations,
notmere
foreignpolicyintereststo be balanced open-endedlyagainstothersubconstitutional
"federalismconcerns."If
theywere not binding,then I agree thatthe decision whetheror not to give themeffectwas to be made by
the federalGovernment.
*Professorof Law. GeorgetownUniversity
Law Center.
'Vienna Conventionon ConsularRelations,Apr. 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, 596 UNTS 261.
2
Breardv. Greene, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998). That the individualhas rightsunder the treatyis evidentfrom
Article36(1). SeeBreardv. Pruett,134 F.3d 615, 621-22 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner,J.,concurring);Faulderv.
Johnson,81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir.) (arrestee'srightsunder theVienna ConventionwereviolatedwhenTexas
officialsfailed to informarresteeof his rightto contactthe Canadian Consulate), cert.denied,117 S.Ct. 487
(1996); Lori FislerDamrosch,TheJusticiability
ofParaguay'sClaimofTreatyViolation,
infrap. 697. Like human
rightsand denial ofjustice claims,the individual'srightsshould not be waivableby the national's state,for
example,byacceptance of an apology.Seealso infranote 23.

